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Abstract 
The affect associated with negative (or unpleasant) memories typically tends to fade faster than 
the affect associated with positive (or pleasant) memories, a phenomenon called the fading affect 
bias (FAB).  We conducted a study to explore the mechanisms related to the FAB. A 
retrospective recall procedure was used to obtain three self-report measures (memory vividness, 
rehearsal frequency, affective fading) for both positive events and negative events.  Affect for 
positive events faded less than affect for negative events, and positive events were recalled more 
vividly than negative events.  The perceived vividness of an event (memory vividness) and the 
extent to which an event has been rehearsed (rehearsal frequency) were explored as possible 
mediators of the relation between event valence and affect fading.  Additional models conceived 
of affect fading and rehearsal frequency as contributors to a memory’s vividness.  Results 
suggested that memory vividness was a plausible mediator of the relation between an event’s 
valence and affect fading.  Rehearsal frequency was also a plausible mediator of this relation, but 
only via its effects on memory vividness.  Additional modeling results suggested that affect 
fading and rehearsal frequency were both plausible mediators of the relation between an event’s 
valence and the event’s rated memory vividness.   
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An Exploration of the Relationship among Valence, Fading Affect, Rehearsal Frequency, and 
Memory Vividness for Past Personal Events 
A large corpus of research results shows that the affect associated with negative (or 
unpleasant) memories typically tends to fade faster than the affect associated with positive (or 
pleasant) memories (see Kim & Jang, 2014).  To our knowledge, Cason (1932) first documented 
this effect. He used a retrospective recall procedure in which participants described several 
memories for events that had occurred the previous week; they then reported how those events 
had made them feel at the time of occurrence.  Several weeks later, participants recalled those 
events and reported how those same events made them feel at the time of recall.  Cason found 
that the reported affect for negative events faded more from event occurrence to event recall than 
the reported affect for positive events.  This phenomenon has come to be known as the fading 
affect bias (FAB).  
To this point, the FAB research revival that has followed in the footsteps of Cason has 
typically pursued one (or both) of two objectives.  One of these objectives was simply to verify 
that the FAB is a real phenomenon.  One thrust of this verification-focused research has been to 
show that the FAB findings are not the result of an artifact of method (e.g., biased event 
sampling, biased emotion sampling, biased emotion measurement technique), selectivity in 
participant samples (e.g., participants from the U.S.; young-adult participants; Caucasian 
participants), or biases in responding (bias in retrospective recall of emotional experiences).  
The FAB stood up very well to these various method-based challenges (for a review, see 
Skowronski, Walker, Henderson, & Bond, 2014; for more recent evidence, see Bond et al., 2015; 
Henderson, Bond, Alderson & Walker, 2015).  For example, the FAB has been replicated using a 
variety of memory types, including flashbulb memories (Bohn & Berntsen, 2007) and memories 
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for dreams (Ritchie & Skowronski, 2008).  The bias occurs across various ways of measuring 
affect (for variations, see Ritchie & Skowronski, 2008; Ritchie et al., 2006; Walker, Vogl, & 
Thompson, 1997; Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Thompson, 2003). Landau and Gunter 
(2009) showed that the FAB occurs regardless of whether event types are collected within-
participants or between-participants, and irrespective of the order in which ratings of event 
emotions are obtained.  The FAB has been demonstrated across a variety of positive emotions 
and negative emotions (Ritchie, Skowronski, Hartnett, Wells, & Walker, 2009), and seems to 
occur regardless of whether the event-related emotions were active emotions (elated, angry) or 
passive emotions (calm, sad).  Moreover, the temporal characteristics of the FAB seem to be 
reasonably well behaved.  For example, in three diary studies, Gibbons, Lee, and Walker (2011) 
provided evidence that the FAB had emerged within 24 hours after an event and remained stable 
for at least 3 months.  Other research has demonstrated that the FAB is not a consequence of 
naïve participant beliefs about their memories: Participants believe that negative memories have 
longer-lasting emotional effects than positive memories (Ritchie et al., 2009).  In addition, a 
number of studies have found that the FAB emerges across: (1) various regions of the U.S., (2) 
various ethnicities (e.g., African-American, American Indian, and Puerto Rican), and (3) various 
age groups (see Ritchie, Batteson et al., 2015; Ritchie, Watson, Roopun, & Skowronski, 2016). 
Cross-cultural evidence for the FAB is also now emerging (Ritchie, Batteson et al., 2015; 
Skowronski, Sedikides, Xie, & Zhou, 2015), with FAB evidence coming from England (from 
both a Caucasian sub-population and a Black sub-population), China, Ghana, Germany, and New 
Zealand (from both a Caucasian sub-population and a Maori sub-population).   
A second thrust evident in the existing corpus of FAB research focuses on moderation of 
the effect.  Research shows that the FAB does not occur for all kinds of events.  Ritchie et al. 
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(2006) found that the magnitude of the FAB was especially small when autobiographical events 
were perceived to be self-important (also see Ritchie, Skowronski, Cadogan, & Sedikides, 2014), 
psychologically open (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005), or self-caused.  The Ritchie et al. (2006) 
results also showed that the FAB was especially large when events were seen as especially 
atypical of a person’s life, when they were judged to be frequently rehearsed, and when they 
were judged to be rehearsed by means of discussing the events with others.  Results reported by 
Gibbons et al. (2013) linked the FAB to the extent to which events involved alcohol 
consumption:  Negative events related to high alcohol consumption lost their negative affect 
charge particularly extensively and thus might contribute to reinforce problematic behaviors 
related to high alcohol consumption. 
Research also suggests that the FAB does not occur equally for all kinds of people.  For 
example, research results suggest that the FAB is minimized in dysphoric individuals, such that 
at the highest level of dysphoria, negative affect and positive affect faded equally (Walker et al., 
2003).  The FAB is also moderated by an individual’s level of anxiety.  Research results showed 
that increased anxiety was associated with both a lowered FAB and lower overall fading of affect 
for both positive events and negative events (Walker, Yancu, & Skowronski, 2014).  Narcissism 
is another individual difference variable that moderates the FAB.  Results from two studies 
(Ritchie, Walker, Marsh, Hart, & Skowronski, 2015) showed that participants low in narcissism 
evidenced a large FAB, but participants high in narcissism evidenced a diminished or reversed 
FAB (i.e., affect for positive events faded more than affect for negative events).  Another study 
showed that narcissism interacted with event type:  Those high in narcissism evinced a FAB 
when they recalled achievement-themed autobiographical events but evinced a reversed FAB 
when they recalled communal-themed events.  These individual difference-related moderations 
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of the FAB are not limited to the trait domain, but emerge in response to manipulations of states.  
For example, results from several studies reported by Skowronski et al. (2015) showed that 
emotional reactions to memories were altered by several manipulations.  For instance, when the 
working self was changed by adopting a third-person perspective during recall, emotional 
reactions to recalled events were dampened compared to when a first-person perspective was 
adopted.  Additionally, after exposure to a mortality salience manipulation that increased 
perceived self-worth, emotional reactions to memories were highly positive.  
One issue that has arisen in FAB research and theorizing concerns the relation of the 
FAB to characteristics of personal event memories, such as a memory’s recallability, clarity, or 
vividness.  For example, some researchers have reported that positive personal event memories 
tend to be better recalled than negative personal event memories (e.g., Thompson, Skowronski, 
Larsen & Betz, 1996 Levine & Bluck, 2004).  Citing such findings, Skowronski (2011) 
suggested that both the FAB and this positivity bias in personal event memory might reflect the 
operation of cognitive processes and motivational processes that work towards the promotion 
and maintenance of self-positivity.  The fact that both the FAB and personal event memories are 
driven by common processes and motives suggests that, at the least, the FAB ought to be 
correlated with how well an event is recalled.   
Some researchers go even further down this path, suggesting that there might be a causal 
relation between the FAB and memory quality.  For example, when examining the content of 
personal event recall, Holmes (1970) found better recall for positive events than for negative 
events.  Holmes wondered if the greater fading of affect for negative events than for positive 
events could cause this positivity bias in memory content, speculating that events that maintained 
their affect over time were more likely to be well-recalled.  Walker et al. (1997) pursued a 
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different line of causal reasoning.  They were interested in the idea that the FAB might be a 
consequence of event recall.  In this view, in comparison to negative memories, the superior 
recall for positive memories causes memories to retain their affective potency across time.  
However, neither the analyses reported by Holmes nor the analyses reported by Walker et al. 
provided support for their causal theorizing.   
Recent research reported by Ritchie and Batteson (2013) also examined these alternative 
causal theories. They found evidence from analyses of retrospective recall data that over time 
memories for negative events lose more episodic detail (they assessed a memory’s colorfulness) 
than positive memories. Their analyses also yielded a FAB effect in the affective reactions that 
people had to their memories. These outcomes replicate ones reported by Holmes (1970) and 
Walker et al. (1997).  However, Ritchie and Batteson also assessed the possible causal linkage 
between memory content and the FAB by applying advanced statistical modeling techniques to 
their data.  Results from these analyses suggested that: (1) differences in the rated colorfulness of 
positive personal memories and in the rated colorfulness of negative personal memories was a 
statistically plausible cause of the FAB (as suggested by Walker et al. 1997), and (2) 
contradicting Holmes’ thesis, the FAB was not a statistically plausible cause of differences in the 
rated colorfulness of positive personal memories and the rated colorfulness negative personal 
memories.  In other words, the results reported by Ritchie and Batteson suggest that the FAB 
may be partially driven by the extent to which positive memories and negative memories 
differentially fade across time.   
The Present Study 
The study that we report in the present article continues to explore the possible causal 
relation between the content of event memory (in our case, it was participant ratings of a 
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memory’s vividness) and the FAB.  Following Ritchie and Batteson (2013), we brought 
contemporary statistical modeling techniques to the table when examining this issue.  However, 
Ritchie and Batteson included event rehearsal as a covariate in their models, but did not 
investigate the possible causal role rehearsal might play in the relations between event valence, 
the FAB, and the strength of event memory.  We moved beyond Ritchie and Batteson by adding 
rehearsal frequency to the statistical models that we explored.  Rehearsal frequency is a logical 
variable to use in this regard, for it has been shown in past research to have relations to both the 
FAB (e.g., Ritchie et al., 2006; Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Ritchie, 2009) and to the 
self-reported strength of personal event memories (Thompson et al., 1996).  Indeed, memories 
that are rehearsed often tend to both retain their affect over time and are reported as being well-
recalled (Thompson et al., 1996).  One line of thinking suggests that rehearsal frequency can 
influence the extent to which events retain or lose affect over time in two ways.  One effect 
might be direct, such that high rates of rehearsal might tend to maintain affect because people 
perseverate over their failures or savor their successes.  A second causal route suggests that 
rehearsal frequency can help to retain memory strength, which should promote the retention of 
event-related affect.     
 To explore such possibilities, in the study that we report, we solicited positive event 
memories and negative event memories from participants.  We assessed the extent to which these 
memories retained their affect over time, the extent to which these memories were thought to be 
rehearsed, and the extent to which these memories remained strong.  We operationalized 
memory strength in terms of memory vividness (see D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006).  
We assumed that those well-remembered events ought to retain their episodic characteristics, so 
that well-remembered events would produce a sense of vividness at their recall.   
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 To explore possible causal relations among the fading of affect between event occurrence 
and event recall and the variables of event valence, event rehearsal frequency, and memory 
vividness, these variables were entered into various causal models.  One model linking these 
variables (see Figure 1) followed in the footsteps of Walker et al. (1997) and Ritchie and 
Batteson (2013). This model was primarily interested in whether there was an indirect path from 
event valence to event recall-prompted affect fading that was plausibly mediated by event 
rehearsal frequency and/or by event rehearsal frequency’s effect on event memory strength (i.e. 
memory vividness).  In other words, in this model: (1) positive events may be rehearsed more 
often than negative events (path a); (2) this differential rehearsal frequency itself may be 
responsible for the fading of event-related affect (path b); (3) event valence may be linked to the 
vividness of event recall either because of differences in rehearsal frequency (path c) or directly 
(path d); and (4) these vividness differences in event memories may also contribute to the affect 
produced at event recall (path e).  Also of interest was whether there would be a plausible direct 
effect between event valence and event-prompted affect fading (path f) after the indirect effects 
through rehearsal frequency and memory vividness were accounted for statistically.  We term 
this FAB-focused model 1.  
 However, because many of the variables in our study are measured (instead of 
manipulated), alternative causal models that use these variables can be constructed.  One 
alternative model that was explored (see Figure 2) was similar to FAB-focused model 1 in that 
the model suggested that one indirect path from event valence to the FAB worked through the 
effects of both event rehearsal frequency and/or memory vividness.  However, in this new model 
the causal ordering of rehearsal frequency and memory vividness was reversed from FAB-
focused model 1.   In other words, in this new model: (1) positive events may be recalled more 
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vividly than negative events (path a); (2) this differential vividness itself may be responsible for 
the fading of event-related affect (path b); (3) event valence may be linked to differential 
rehearsal frequency of positive events and negative events either because of differences in 
memory vividness (path c) or directly (path d); and (4) these rehearsal frequency differences for 
positive events and negative events in event memories may also contribute to the fading of affect 
produced at event recall (path e).  We term this FAB-focused model 2.  
However, one might ask whether the FAB causes memory vividness or whether memory 
vividness causes the FAB.  Unlike those ideas that are tested by our two FAB-focused models, it 
is possible that memory vividness might arise due to the affect at event recall, rather than 
contribute to the affect at event recall (Holmes, 1970).  In an attempt to pursue the answer to this 
query, two additional alternative causal models follow in the footsteps of Holmes (1970), who 
hypothesized that memory vividness might be a consequence of the affect prompted by event 
recall.  Following Holmes, both of those models examine the idea that there is an indirect causal 
pathway from event valence to vividness of personal memory event recall.   
One plausible model (depicted in Figure 3) assumes: (1) the affect prompted by positive 
events may fade less than the affect prompted by negative events (path a); (2) affect fading may 
be directly responsible for the perceived vividness of a personal event memory (path b); (3) 
event valence may be linked to rehearsal frequency either directly (path d) or indirectly from 
affect fading (path c); and (4) these differential rehearsal frequencies may also contribute to the 
vividness with which events are recalled (path e).   Also of interest was whether there would be a 
plausible direct effect between event valence and the vividness of event recall (path f) after the 
indirect effects through rehearsal frequency and affect fading were accounted for statistically.  
We term this model memory vividness-focused model 1.   
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A second seemingly plausible model in the footsteps of Holmes (1970) (depicted in 
Figure 4) assumes:  (1) positive events may be rehearsed more often than negative events (path 
a); (2) rehearsal frequency may be directly responsible for the memory vividness of a personal 
event (path b); (3) event valence may be linked to the fading of event-prompted affect either 
directly (path d) or indirectly through rehearsal frequency (path c); and (4) the extent to which 
event-related affect fading affects the vividness of event recall (path e).  Also of interest was 
whether there would be a plausible direct effect between event valence and the vividness of 
event recall (path f) after the indirect effects through rehearsal frequency and affect fading were 
accounted for statistically.  We term this model the memory vividness-focused model 2.   
Research overview.  Thus to summarize, our initial analyses looked for several 
straightforward effects:  (1) the affect prompted by a positive personal event memory should fade 
less from event occurrence to event recall than the affect prompted by a negative event memory; 
(2) positive memories ought to be reported as being rehearsed more often than negative 
memories; (3) frequently rehearsed events ought to be events that are vividly recalled, (4) vividly 
recalled memories should evince less fading of affect than non-vividly recalled memories, (5) 
frequently rehearsed memories should evince less fading than events that are not frequently 
rehearsed, and (6) positive memories should be more vividly recalled than negative memories.   
If these effects emerge, then the causal modeling analyses will proceed.  Each of the four 
models that we have outlined will be examined to see how well they fit the data.  Of particular 
interest would be whether such analyses are especially supportive of a particular causal 
sequence.  For example, one issue of interest was whether differential memory vividness for 
positive events and negative events was a statistically plausible cause of the FAB (as in the FAB-
focused models) or whether the FAB was a statistically plausible cause of differential memory 
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for positive events and negative events (as in the memory vividness-focused models). A second 
issue of interest was whether rehearsal frequency might have direct effects on the fading of affect 
(FAB-focused models) or whether its effects worked through memory vividness (FAB-focused 
model 1s).  A third issue of interest was whether, in predicting the vividness of event recall, the 
more plausible model was one in which rehearsal predicted the fading of affect (memory 
vividness-focused model 1) or was one in which the fading of affect predicted rehearsal (memory 
vividness-focused model 2).    
Method 
Participants 
 Participants included 100 people recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
worker pool (69% women). This sample size was determined a priori based on past research 
investigating the FAB using designs similar to ours (e.g., Ritchie & Skowronski, 2008, N = 82).  
However, because we collected the data using Mturk, which has not been commonly used in the 
FAB literature, to ensure that a sufficiently large event sample would remain after data cleaning 
we decided to collect a larger sample size than has typically been obtained in past FAB research. 
 Twenty participants started the survey, but dropped out before finishing. We included in 
our analyses only data from those MTurk participants who completed the survey and filed for 
payment.  Responses from six additional participants were deleted because they wrote nonsense 
text in the open-ended response boxes.  
 Thus, analyses included data from 94 participants.  Their average age was 39.33 years 
(SD=14.88, range=18-77).  Most participants were White (79.6%; 6.5% Black, 4.3% Asian, 
3.2% Hispanic, 6.5% other).  All participants were recruited from the United States.  On average, 
there was a time lag of 27.65 min between the time at which participants accepted the 
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assignment on Mturk and the time at which a participant reported that the assignment was 
completed.  Participants received $.25 for participating.   
Procedure 
 Each participant was prompted to recall eight memories of events from their life that 
occurred no more than 10 years ago (for a similar procedure, see Ritchie et al. 2009).  They were 
asked to recall memories for events that were unique in that they did not happen repeatedly and 
occurred at a particular place and time.  Participants were prompted by the survey to recall each 
of the eight memories one at a time.  The valence of the memories recalled was a within-
participants variable.  Participants were prompted to recall four events about which they felt 
positively at time each the event occurred (positive valence).  Participants were also prompted to 
recall four events about which they felt negatively at the time each event occurred (negative 
valence).  To minimize the possible influence of the order in which events of the two different 
valences were recalled, the order in which participants were asked to recall negative events and 
to recall positive events was randomized across participants.   
 For each prompted memory, participants provided a short title so that they could be asked 
about that specific memory later in the study.  Participants also wrote a short description of the 
event.  At the time of event description, participants also provided ratings of the extent to which 
they rehearsed each event, the vividness of their memory for each event, and the intensity of the 
affect experienced at the time the event occurred (initial event affect).  After recalling and rating 
all eight memories on these three characteristics, participants were shown the short title for each 
memory, and were asked how each event made them feel now that they were recalling the event 
(current event affect).  
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Materials 
 Event rehearsal.  The single item “Since it happened, have you thought or talked about 
this event?” was used to measure event rehearsal for each recalled event (adapted from Ritchie & 
Batteson, 2013). Participants responded to this item on a scale that ranged from 1 (Not at all) to 6 
(As often as any event in my life). Responses for this item were normally distributed with a 
skewness of -.29 (SE=.18). 
  Memory vividness. Fourteen items (adapted from D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2006) were used to measure memory vividness.  The individual items were presented with scales 
that differed in scale length. The most general item “How vivid is this memory” was presented 
with a five-point response scale ranging from 1 (No image at all) to 5 (Perfectly clear as if I 
were actually seeing it). Other items, such as “While remembering the event, I feel as though I 
am reliving it,” were presented with a six-point response scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 
(completely). Participants responded to yet another set of items using a seven-point response 
scale that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely). An example from this latter set of items is 
“While remembering the event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it happened.”  Because 
of the different response scale lengths, the items could not be directly combined into an index.  
Instead, the responses were first separately standardized for each vividness item.  After 
standardization, the responses for each participant were averaged across vividness items.  This 
calculation was done separately for positive events and for negative events (α for positive events 
=.94, α for negative events =.95).     
Affect Intensity. Participants responded to a measure of initial affect intensity and a 
measure of current affect intensity for each recalled event (from Ritchie & Batteson, 2013). 
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 Initial affect intensity.  The item that measured initial affect intensity was “How positive 
or negative did the event make you feel at the time it occurred?” Participants responded to this 
item on a scale from 1 (extremely negative) to 7 (extremely positive). Responses were recoded to 
reflect a scale from -3 to +3 with the sign matching negative affect or positive affect. Prior to 
analysis, those responses in which the initial affect intensity of a positive event was rated as 
neutral or negative (n = 11) and responses in which the initial affect intensity of a negative event 
was rated as neutral or positive (n = 25) were coded as missing data.  
Current affect intensity.  The item that measured affect intensity at event recall was 
“How positive or negative does the event make you feel when you recall it now?” Participants 
responded to this item on a scale from 1 (extremely negative) to 7 (extremely positive). These 
responses were again recoded to reflect a scale from -3 to +3.  
Affect fading score.  A fading affect score was usually calculated for each item by 
subtracting the absolute value of the current affect intensity score from the absolute value of the 
initial affect intensity score.  However, on occasion the affect associated with a memory changed 
in valence over time.  For example, a memory could occasionally change in valence from very 
positive affect (+3) at occurrence to very negative affect at recall (-3).  When these valence 
changes occurred, we capped the difference score at 0 (producing a maximum difference of 3) so 
that the affect change was not reflected in the difference score. 
This decision is rooted in both theory and research practice.  Affect “fading” was 
originally conceived of as occurring when emotions decreased in intensity from occurrence to 
recall, with a floor at 0 (no emotion).   However, not all events exhibit fading.  In the lag from 
event occurrence to event recall, events can retain their affect (fixed affect) or can intensify in 
their affect (flourishing affect).   Moreover, when affect is measured on a bipolar scale (as in the 
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present research), some events evince valence change (flexible affect).   Collectively, these non-
fading events happen often:  It would not be a surprise to see one-third of the events in a sample 
be non-fading events. 
  The FAB research community does not exhibit consensus as to how to handle these non-
fading events.  One option is to drop all non-fading events from the data, so that the analysis 
looks only at events that exhibited fading.  Critics of this approach suggest that it is excessively 
conservative, potentially biased, and results in too much data loss.  A second approach is simply 
to take the data “as is,” directly analyzing change scores.  Critics of this approach suggest that it 
may produce the illusory “fading” – average scores that seem to reflect fading can be caused 
when many events “flip” affect.   
Ultimately, preferred data analysis approaches tend to be driven more by theoretical 
preferences and by data analysis preferences than by results – prior FAB studies have explored 
these different data analysis approaches, and the FAB has emerged regardless (for additional 
discussion of this issue, see Ritchie et al., 2009; Skowronski et al., 2014; Walker & Skowronski, 
2009).  We are uncomfortable excluding from analysis all non-fading events, and we are also 
uncomfortable using all the data “as is” knowing that “fading” might to some extent reflect affect 
“flipping.”  Our middle-ground position, which includes all data but caps the extent to which the 
affect flips influence the results, seems to us to be a reasonable compromise. Moreover, we 
decided on this approach a priori, so we are immune from the claim that we chose the data 
analysis technique that produced the best results.   
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Results 
Initial Results 
Responses to the eight memories provided by each participant were examined to see if 
frequently rehearsed events were also events that were vividly recalled. This possibility was 
explored using multiple regression analyses, which has been the analytic technique used in many 
fading affect bias studies (see Ritchie et al., 2015).  Given the clustered nature of the data, as in 
past research (Gibbons et al, 2013; Ritchie & Batteson, 2013), a nominal-level participant 
variable was included in all analyses.  This technique “partials out” between-subject variance in 
the analysis from the within-subject variance in the analysis, theoretically allowing tests of the 
within-subject effects (e.g., event valence) to be uncontaminated by between-subject effects (see 
Cohen & Cohen, 1983, Chapter 11).   
After controlling for individual differences in responding via assigning dummy codes to 
participants and entering those dummy codes into the regression model, self-reported rehearsal 
frequency significantly predicted self-reported memory vividness as assessed by the memory 
vividness index, b = .15 (SE = .013), F(1, 654) = 126.36, p < .001, MSE = .31. 
The responses were also examined to see if frequently rehearsed events evinced less 
fading of affect than less frequently rehearsed memories.  This result emerged from a multiple 
regression analysis in which self-reported rehearsal was used to predict the difference between 
affect reports at initial event occurrence and affect reported at event recall, b = -.13 (SE = .025), 
F(1, 606) = 26.69, p < .001, MSE = .93. 
We also examined whether vividly recalled memories evinced less fading of affect than 
less vividly recalled memories. This result emerged from a multiple regression analysis in which 
the memory vividness index was used to predict the difference between affect reports at initial 
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event occurrence and affect reported at event recall, b = -.15 (SE = .065), F(1, 607) = 5.36, p = 
.021, MSE = .96.   
 For the next three analyses, as in past research (Gibbons et al, 2013; Walker, Skowronski, 
Gibbons, Vogl, & Thompson, 2003) for each participant and for each event valence dependent 
measures were separately averaged.1  Hence, each participant had, for both the positive items 
they recalled and the negative items they recalled, an event rehearsal frequency average, a 
memory vividness index average, and an affect fading average.   Three analyses used these 
averages.  
One analysis looked for evidence that the affect prompted by a positive personal event 
memory changed less from event occurrence to event recall (.27) than the affect prompted by a 
negative event memory (.60).  This result emerged from a within-subject ANOVA, F(1, 93) = 
15.48, p < .001, partial η 2 = .143.  
A second analysis looked for evidence that positive memories were reported as being 
rehearsed more often (5.23) than negative memories (4.52).  This result emerged from a within-
subject ANOVA, F(1, 93) = 24.88, p < .001, partial η 2 = .211.  
The third analysis looked for evidence that positive memories (.107) were reported to be 
more vividly recalled than negative memories (-.103).  This result emerged from a within-subject 
ANOVA, F(1, 93) = 17.11, p < .001, partial η 2 = .155. 
Model Testing 
 In four separate models, we examined relations among event valence (positive vs. 
negative), event rehearsal frequency, memory vividness, and affect fading.  In these models, 
average event rehearsal frequency, memory vividness, and affect fading were calculated 
separately for the four positive events and the four negative events so that for each participant 
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there were two scores (one for positive events and one for negative events) for each variable: 
memory valence, event rehearsal frequency, memory vividness, and affect fading.   
We examined the relations among these variables using the method specified by Preacher 
and Hayes (2004) in Model 6 of the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2009).  As in our earlier 
regression analyses and past research (see Ritchie & Batteson, 2013), we again entered a 
nominal-level participant variable into all analyses to control for the variance between 
participants.  All effects are bootstrapped estimates based on 10,000 trials.  The path analyses 
conducted in PROCESS used fully saturated models. When the results indicated that any of these 
paths were not statistically significant, we also modeled the data in MPlus (version 7.3, Muthén 
& Muthén, 2011) without these paths to obtain fit indices. 
FAB-focused model 1.  For FAB-focused model 1, the PROCESS model analysis tested 
a total of three indirect effects: one indirect effect from event valence to affect fading through 
both rehearsal frequency and memory vividness, one indirect effect from event valence to affect 
fading only through rehearsal frequency, and one indirect effect from event valence to affect 
fading only through memory vividness.  Only one significant indirect effect emerged: The 
indirect effect that included both rehearsal frequency and memory vividness, indirect = -.02 
(SE=.01) CI95%= -.04, -.006.  This effect suggests that event valence had a positive effect on 
rehearsal frequency, such that positive events are rehearsed more than negative events, b= .36, 
t(185) = 3.67, p = .0003; rehearsal frequency was positively related to memory vividness b= .18, 
t(184) = 6.62, p = .001; and memory vividness was negatively related to affect fading, b= -.29, 
t(183) = -2.87, p = .005.  The analysis results did not support the idea that event valence was 
related to affect fading only through rehearsal frequency, indirect = -.02 (SE=.02), CI95%=-.06, 
.002 (see Figure 1 for regression coefficients).  The analysis results also did not support the idea 
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that event valence was related to affect fading only through memory vividness, indirect = -.01 
(SE=.01), CI95%=-.04, .006 (see Figure 1 for regression coefficients).  Finally, in this model 
these indirect pathways did not fully account for the relationship between event valence and 
affect fading:  In this model, the direct effect of event valence on affect fading was significant, 
direct = -.11 (SE=.05), CI95% = -.22, -.01, even accounting for the indirect pathways.   
The full model was fully saturated and no fit indices were therefore available for that 
model.  However, because two indirect paths (b and d) were non-significant, those paths were 
deleted from the model and a model fit test was conducted in MPlus.  Several statistical results 
suggest that the resulting model showed good overall fit to the data.  According to Hu and 
Bentler (1995), a model demonstrates good fit when the Chi-square test of model fit is not 
significant (χ2(2) = 3.51, p = .17), the Comparative Fit Index (.99) and the Tucker-Lewis Index 
(.94) exceed the .95 threshold, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (.025) is smaller 
than the .08 threshold, and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (.063) is smaller than 
the .06 threshold. While the Tucker-Lewis Index and the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation only approach the thresholds, the overall conclusion from examination of these 
indices is that the model is a good fit to the data. 
Thus, the results for this model suggest that the link between event valence and affect 
fading may be related to the differential tendency to rehearse positive events and negative events 
and to the differential memory vividness effects for positive memories and negative memories 
that are produced by such rehearsal frequency.  The results fits with the suggestion of Walker et 
al. (1997) that the FAB may be a consequence of the differential vividness of positive events and 
negative events in memory.  Nonetheless, the model results also suggest that there is an effect of 
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event valence on affect fading above and beyond that which occurs through rehearsal frequency 
and memory vividness.   
FAB-focused model 2.  We also considered an alternative model in which the order of 
rehearsal frequency and memory vividness were reversed from FAB-focused model 1.  For FAB-
focused model 2, the PROCESS model analysis tested a total of three indirect effects: one 
indirect effect from event affect to affect fading through both memory vividness and event 
rehearsal frequency, one indirect effect from event valence to affect fading through memory 
vividness only, and one indirect effect from event valence to affect fading through rehearsal 
frequency only.  For this model, only one significant indirect effect emerged (see Figure 2 for 
regression coefficients). This path worked through only memory vividness (path a→ path b), 
indirect = -.03 (SE=.02) CI95% = -.07, -.007.  This effect suggests that event valence had a 
positive effect on memory vividness, such that positive events are recalled more vividly than 
negative events, b= .11, t(185) = 2.60, p = .0100.  Then, memory vividness was negatively 
related to affect fading, b= -.29, t(183) = -2.87, p = .005.  Both of the other tested indirect effects 
were not statistically significant.  The indirect effect of event valence on affect fading that 
worked through memory vividness and then event rehearsal frequency (path a→ path c→ path e) 
was not viable, indirect = -.01 (SE=.01), CI95% = -.02, .0002 (see Figure 2 for regression 
coefficients).  The indirect effect of event valence on affect fading that worked only through 
event rehearsal frequency (path d→ path e) was also not viable, indirect = -.02 (SE=.01), CI95% 
= -.04, .0006.  Finally, in this model these indirect pathways did not fully account for the 
relationship between event valence and affect fading:  The direct effect of event valence on 
affect fading in this model was significant, direct = -.12 (SE=.05), CI95% = -.22, -.01.  
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Removing the non-significant path e results in a model with two outcome variables.  
Hence, the model remains fully saturated and no fit test can be computed.  
In summary, the results for this model suggests that the link between event valence and 
affect fading may be at least partially related to differential memory vividness for positive 
memories and negative memories. This result fits with the suggestion of Walker et al. (1997) that 
the FAB may be a consequence of the differential vividness of positive events and negative 
events in memory.  Nonetheless, the model results also suggest that there is an effect of event 
valence on affect fading beyond that which occurs through memory vividness.  
Memory Vividness-Focused Model 1.  However, one can also take the view of Holmes 
(1970) and wonder whether the FAB works in the service of promoting vividness of memory.  
The memory vividness-focused model 1 is one way to conceive of this view.   
The PROCESS model analysis tested three indirect effects for this model.  Results from 
the analysis suggested that all three indirect routes were significant (see Figure 2 for regression 
coefficients).  One effect works from event valence to vividness through affect fading, indirect = 
.02 (SE=.01), CI95% = .01, .06.  This significant indirect effect suggests that event valence 
affects affect fading, such that affect for negative events fades faster than affect for positive 
events (the FAB), which may, in turn, affect memory vividness, b = -.14, t(183) = -2.87, p = 
.005.  A second effect works from event valence to memory vividness through rehearsal 
frequency, indirect = .05 (SE=.02), CI95% = .017, .09. This significant indirect effect suggests 
that event valence may indirectly affect memory vividness, such that positive events are 
rehearsed more than negative events, which may, in turn, affect memory vividness, b= .16, t(183) 
= 5.96, p = .005.  A third effect works from event valence to memory vividness through the 
effects of affect fading on rehearsal frequency, indirect = .01 (SE=.01) CI95% = .003, .03.   This 
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last effect suggests that event valence had a negative effect on affect fading, such that affect for 
negative events faded faster than affect for positive events, b= -.17, t(185) = -3.24, p = .001; 
affect fading was negatively related to event rehearsal frequency, b= -.41, t(184) = -3.03, p = 
.003; and event rehearsal frequency was positively related to memory vividness, b= .16, t(183) = 
5.96, p = .001.  Finally, for this model, these indirect pathways fully accounted for the 
relationship between event valence and memory vividness:  The direct effect of event valence on 
memory vividness in this model was not significant, direct = .02 (SE=.04), CI95% = -.05, .1.  
Because one path (f) was non-significant, that path was dropped from the model and the 
model fit was examined using MPlus.  A number of statistical results show that the resulting 
model showed good overall fit (Hu & Bentler, 1995). The Chi-square test of model fit was not 
significant (χ2(1) = .32, p = .57). The Comparative Fit Index (1.00) was larger than .95. The 
Tucker-Lewis Index was 1.02 and thus larger than .95.  The Standardized Root Mean Square 
Residual (.004) was smaller than .08, and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (< 
.001) was smaller than .06. 
Memory Vividness-Focused Model 2.  A second model that can be considered when 
thinking about the relation between event valence and memory vividness is presented is memory 
vividness-focused model 2.   
The PROCESS model analysis tested three indirect effects for this model.  All were 
significant. In one of these, the relation between event valence and memory vividness worked 
only through rehearsal frequency, indirect = .06 (SE=.02), CI95% = .03, .1.  As was suggested 
by memory vividness-focused model 1, this significant indirect effect suggests that event valence 
may directly affect event rehearsal frequency, such that positive events are rehearsed more than 
negative events, and rehearsal may, in turn, affect memory vividness, b = .16, t(183) = 5.96, p = 
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.001.  In the second indirect path, the relation between event valence and memory vividness 
works only through affect fading, indirect = .02 (SE=.01), CI95% = .04, .05.  This significant 
indirect effect suggests that event valence affects affect fading, such that affect for negative 
events fades faster than affect for positive events (the FAB), which may, in turn, affect memory 
vividness, b = -.15, t(183) = -2.87, p = .005. In the third indirect path, the relation between event 
valence and perceived memory vividness works through the effect that rehearsal frequency has 
on affect fading, indirect = .01 (SE=.004) CI95%= .002, .02.  This indirect effect implies that 
event valence had a positive effect on rehearsal frequency, such that positive events were 
rehearsed more than negative events, b = .36, t(185) = 3.67, p = .0003.  Then, rehearsal 
frequency was negatively related to affect fading, b = -.12, t(184) = -3.03, p = .003.  Finally, 
event rehearsal frequency was then positively related to memory vividness, b = .16, t(183) = 
5.96, p = .001.   As would be expected from the results of the PROCESS analysis for memory 
vividness-focused model 1, these indirect pathways fully accounted for the relationship between 
event valence and memory vividness:  The direct effect of event valence on memory vividness in 
this model was not significant, direct = .02 (SE=.04), CI95% = -.05, .1.    
 Because one path (f) was non-significant, that path was dropped from the model and 
model fit was examined using MPlus.  Statistical results indicated that the resulting model was a 
good overall fit to the data (Hu & Bentler, 1995). The Chi-square test of model fit was not 
significant (χ2(1) = .32, p = .57). The Comparative Fit Index (1.00) and the Tucker-Lewis Index 
(1.02) were larger than .95. The Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (.004) was smaller 
than .08.  The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (< .001) was smaller than .06.    
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Discussion 
A retrospective recall procedure was used to obtain three self-report measures (memory 
vividness, rehearsal frequency, affect fading) for both positive events and negative events.  
Descriptive results from these measures evinced a fading affect bias:  The intensity of emotions 
associated with positive events faded less from event occurrence to event recall than the intensity 
of emotions associated with negative events.  The self-reports of memory also showed that 
positive events were recalled more vividly than negative events.  The self-reports of rehearsal 
frequency showed that positive events were rehearsed more frequently than negative events.   
Causal modeling techniques were used to consider various relations among these 
variables.  In two models, both of which fit the data, event rehearsal frequency and memory 
vividness were conceived of as contributors to affect fading.  In both models, memory vividness 
was a statistically plausible mediator of the relation between event valence and affective fade.  In 
one model, this memory vividness effect was itself influenced by rehearsal frequency.  In the 
second model, this memory vividness effect did not influence rehearsal frequency, but directly 
affected affect fading.  The results from both models affirm the conclusion of Ritchie and 
Batteson (2013) that memory vividness was a plausible mediator of the relation between event 
valence and affect fading.  These results add to the Ritchie and Batteson (2013) conclusion by 
suggesting that rehearsal frequency may be linked to event valence and that rehearsal frequency 
may influence memory vividness, so that rehearsal frequency may influence the fading affect 
bias via its influence on memory vividness.   
Our models, in which event rehearsal is included as a causal variable rather than as a 
covariate, extend the conclusion offered by Ritchie and Batteson by suggesting that event 
rehearsal may play causal role in the understanding of the FAB.  Ritchie and Batteson’s study 
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was the first to suggest that vivid imagery might play a causal role in the FAB; ours is the 
second.  Further, our study extends the findings of Ritchie and Batteson by suggesting that 
rehearsal frequency also plays a causal role in the effects of memory vividness on the FAB. 
However, these results might be qualified by the kind of rehearsal that people use when 
thinking about personal events (see Muir, Brown, & Madill, 2015; Ritchie et al., 2006; 
Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl., & Walker, 2004; Skowronski & Walker, 2004).  While some forms 
of rehearsal (e.g., rumination) might serve to maintain both negative affect and positive affect, 
other forms of rehearsal (social, savoring) might serve to maintain positive affect but minimize 
negative affect.  Both our study and the Ritchie and Batteson (2013) study assessed overall 
rehearsal frequency but did not address the distinction among rehearsal types with respect to the 
effect that these may have on affect fading.  This nuance can be explored in future research.  
Two additional models treated memory vividness as the outcome variable and explored 
whether affect fading was a statistically plausible mediator of the relation between event valence 
and memory vividness.  In contrast to the conclusions offered by Ritchie and Batteson (2013), 
the results from both models suggested that affect fading was a plausible mediator of the event 
valence-memory vividness relation.  The models were equivocal as to whether the effect of 
affect fading on memory vividness was itself due to rehearsal frequency, or whether this relation 
was itself mediated by rehearsal frequency.  However, regardless of the ordering of these two 
variables, in both models the combination of all the mediated routes from event valence fully 
accounted for the link from event valence to memory vividness.  These memory-vividness 
focused models are novel and interesting, given past work has discussed fading affect and the 
FAB as mechanisms that promote healthy functioning (e.g., Walker & Skowronski, 2009). 
Despite this interest, little work has explored the FAB as a mechanism leading to memory 
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outcomes.  These models deviate from the typical way in which the FAB is researched in the 
literature. Although the fading affect bias has been replicated numerous times (Ritchie & 
Skowronski, 2008; Ritchie et al., 2006; Walker & Skowronski, 2009; Walker, Vogl, & 
Thompson, 1997; Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Thompson, 2003) it is typically seen 
as the outcome of memory processes and not as a contributor to memory.   
The reasons for the disparity between our conclusions about these latter two models and 
the conclusions reached by Ritchie and Batteson (2013) need to be explored in future research. 
One possible reason for this disparity may lie in the exact details of the models used to explore 
the data.  In their modeling efforts, Ritchie and Batteson (2013) explored the relations among 
event valence, affect fading, and memory after controlling for rehearsal frequency.  Instead, we 
included rehearsal frequency as a variable in our models.  To see if this modeling difference 
accounted for the results disparity, we conducted an analysis in which we duplicated the Ritchie 
and Batteson approach.  The pattern of results matched the pattern found by Ritchie and Bateson, 
such that memories for positive events were perceived to be more vivid than memories for 
negative events, albeit not significantly, b = .04, t(184) = 1.06, p = .29.  Further, memory 
vividness negatively predicted affect fading, such that the more vivid memories were, the less 
affect fading occurred, b = -.29, t(183) = -2.87, p = .005.  However, the indirect effect of 
memory vividness on the relationship between memory valence and affect fading was not 
statistically reliable as the confidence interval included zero, indirect = -.12 (SE=.05), CI95% = -
.04, .01.  Thus, even when similar models were employed, our results did not match the results 
reported by Ritchie and Batteson (2013).   
A second possible reason for the disparity may lie in how some of the variables were 
measured.  The Ritchie and Batteson (2013) study assessed memory via self-reports of a 
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memory’s colorfulness.  The memory assessment that we used reflected overall assessments of a 
memory’s vividness.  While both measures were intended to reflect the extent to which a 
memory retained its episodic qualities, the measures are obviously not identical.  A second 
difference reflects the memory procedure that was used.  Ritchie and Batteson (2013) asked 
people to recall an event that had occurred the day before the recall session.  In our study, we 
allowed participants to recall events that occurred any time in the last 10 years.  Because of this 
methodical difference, our participants had to think further back, up to 10 years ago, to provide 
ratings of the way they felt when the event occurred than Ritchie and Batteson’s participants who 
recalled how they felt when the event occurred yesterday.  Due to this methodological difference, 
it is possible that the ratings of initial affect that we obtained were more biased by present affect 
than those obtained by Ritchie and Batteson.  Perhaps this difference contributed to the disparity 
between our findings and those reported by Ritchie and Batteson.  An additional difference in the 
memory procedures used includes when the memory for the event was assessed.  Ritchie and 
Batteson repeatedly assessed memory for the event across multiple ratings sessions whereas we 
used only one recall session.  This methodical difference may have compelled participants in our 
study to provide more consistent ratings than those in Ritchie and Batteson’s study.  This 
difference may explain why we found support for multiple causal models whereas Ritchie and 
Batteson reported that only one tested model fit their data.  A third reason may lie in the 
participants:  Ritchie and Batteson’s participants were from Ireland; ours were from the U.S.    
However, in evaluating these possible differences, note that such differences have tended to have 
little impact on the FAB data obtained.  Despite the differences outlined, both our data and the 
Ritchie and Batteson (2013) data yielded a fading affect bias and showed that the fading of affect 
was related to the retention of the episodic quality of memory (colorfulness, vividness).  
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However, because such data have not often been subjected to modeling efforts, it is not known 
whether the modeling results obtained reflect the same insensitivity to method reflected in the 
results obtained on the individual measures.    
We include one more method-related note of caution when considering the results that we 
report.  Some participants who began our study did not complete it.  Despite the attrition, our 
attrition rate (13%) was lower than the rate (30%-50%) reported in other research using Mturk 
samples (Zhou & Fishbach, in press).   However, one concern is that dropout rates from MTurk 
studies might differ across experimental conditions (Zhou & Fishbach, in press).  The fact that 
the key variables in our design were within-participants alleviates this concern.  Nonetheless, it 
remains possible that the participants who dropped out of the study might systematically differ 
from those participants who persisted to completion.  This sampling bias possibility suggests that 
the results that we report might change if data from these dropouts could be obtained.  This 
argues for a replication of the study using a different sampling method. 
 Finally, in evaluating our modeling efforts, one must remember that these are models that 
assess the data “as if” the variables were related in the manner that is modeled.  While these 
models can indicate both that models are statistically plausible and specify the patterns of causal 
relations among variables that are statistically plausible, they do not actually demonstrate 
causality.  Such causality can be demonstrated only by studies that actually manipulate the 
variables (see Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).  Although these manipulations are difficult in the 
context of studies of real-world memory that use personal memories, some opportunities to 
manipulate variables may present themselves (for a rehearsal manipulation that attempted this 
approach, see Skowronski et al. 2004). 
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Coda 
Some theorists have proclaimed that “bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). While in many domains of psychology negativity is 
indeed more powerful than positivity, this rule is wrong when focusing on the typical emotional 
responses that one has to one’s personal memories.  Here, good is stronger than bad:  Emotional 
responses to positive memories generally seem to persist for longer durations than emotional 
responses to negative memories (though there are exceptions).  The results reported in the 
present article suggests that this enhanced positivity is linked to the idea that positive memories 
are more often rehearsed than negative memories, and that positive memories tend to maintain 
their vividness longer than do negative memories. However, it remains to future research to 
explicate more fully the relations among event pleasantness, rehearsal, memory vividness, and 
affect fading.  Additionally, future research is needed to more fully understand the potential of 
the FAB as a contributing mechanism to memory, rather than an outcome influenced by memory.       
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Footnotes 
1A reviewer of the manuscript wondered why we averaged scores across items before 
entering the data into the analysis instead of entering the raw data into the analysis. Retaining the 
original items would have required the use of statistical models that were more complicated than 
the ones that we employed (items were nested within valence, which were nested within 
subjects).  By averaging across item valence, we avoided a level of nesting and could approach 
the analyses using the relatively straightforward regression models that we employed. This 
approach was perfectly suited to the questions that were asked of the data.  Moreover, the models 
that we employed facilitated comparison to the results provided by Ritchie and Batteson (2013), 
who used a similar approach to data analysis.   
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Figure 1: Regression coefficients for the FAB-focused model 1 (*p < .05, **p <.01).  Positive 
event valence is coded as positive one and negative event valence is coded as negative one.  
Number of bootstrap samples = 10,000. Regression coefficients are unstandardized. 
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Figure 2: Regression coefficients for the FAB-focused model 2 (*p < .05, **p <.01).  Positive 
event valence is coded as positive one and negative event valence is coded as negative one.  
Number of bootstrap samples = 10,000. Regression coefficients are unstandardized. 
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Figure 3: Regression coefficients for the memory vividness-focused model 1 (*p < .05, **p 
<.01).   Positive event valence is coded as positive one and negative event valence is coded as 
negative one.  Number of bootstrap samples = 10,000. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardized. 
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Figure 4.  Regression coefficients for memory vividness-focused model 2 (*p < .05, **p <.01).   
Positive event valence is coded as positive one and negative event valence is coded as negative 
one.  Number of bootstrap samples = 10,000. Regression coefficients are unstandardized. 
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